> Kevin Walker wrote:
> Raiders are a fairly common factor in war. A high speed (the long
Yep, eg: Golden Hinde, Emden, etc
> In fact, bombers during wars
In regard to bombers...nope. Bombers only made fairly effective raiders
(specfying a raider as an aircraft or vessel whose purpose it to attack and
destroy economic (ie: Merchant vessels) targets rather than
naval/military
units) at sea until the advent of escort carriers. During the whole of WW2
bombers were pretty crap at hitting specefic targets, ie: facilities in
production centres, hence area bombing was employed, which whilst great at
killing people did not achieve much else (German production rates increased
dramatically during 42-45 even whilst being plastered by the RAF by
night and the USAF by day). Even the raid by 617 squadron on the dams did
little long term, or even short term, production harm. With modern weapons its
a whole different story but then with modern weapons wars are so quick that
production during wartime is not quite the key factor it was 60 years ago.
> ...and limits the ability of
The Battle of Britain was fought and won by the RAF by concentrating forces
along the luftwaffe's axis of attacks (rather than in one point in time and
space). Small groups of upto 3 aircraft operating as raiders could avoid this
but then were unable to cause critical damage to their targets.
Bombers made fairly effective raiders (specfying a raider as an aircraft or
vessel whose purpose it to attack and destroy economic (ie: Merchant
vessels) targets rather than naval/military units) at sea until the
advent of escort carriers.
Neither the Royal Navy or the US Navy were unable to concentrate thier main
battle fleets thanks to raiders. Giving that the Kreigsmarine of WW2 was
pretty much dedicated to surface raiding it actually encouraged the Royal Navy
to concentrate forces when hunting German warships down.
Submarines, especially U-Boats, and USN subs in the Pacific were the
true raiders of modern times...but they relied on stealth and cunning, not
speed to acheive their success.
A Raiders specefic target is merchant shipping, not warships. Design a raider
with thrust 8 engines to avoid enemy warships, fine, but don't arm it
to deal with them...after all it's going to run away ;-)
Regards,
> Matt Tope wrote:
> >In fact, bombers during wars
*At sea*, sure. However, the role the strategic bombers played *over land*
during WW2 was indeed similar indeed to the one played by commerce raiders at
sea: although they didn't reduce the enemy's production and transport of war
materials all that much (in spite of the horrifying civilian casualties they
caused), they *did* force him to spend resources (aircraft, AA guns
etc.) to try and stop them... resources which were therefore not available at
the front lines.
The main value of raiders, at least since WW1, hasn't been what they
actually manage to destroy - it is the much larger forces the enemy has
to divert from the real fighting to protect against them which makes them
worthwhile.
Regards,
> On Friday, September 5, 2003, at 05:43 AM, Matt Tope wrote:
> In regard to bombers...nope. Bombers only made fairly effective
> WW2
Interesting! I had heard some large missions weren't nearly as effective as
first thought, but I hadn't realized the effectiveness was so much less (so
much for the documentaries I've seen).:) I'll have to dig up some time and
investigate.
> On Friday, September 5, 2003, at 05:43 AM, Matt Tope wrote:
At the risk of committing air power heresy I'll go one further and claim that
the importance of the Allied bomber offensives were that they attrited the
Luftwaffe, draining German men and resources just as the land battles did.
With "more" of each at their disposal it was a winning proposition for the
Allies. The secondary advantage lay in virtually eliminating the Luftwaffe's
ability to play a battlefield interdiction role in the west. As the campaigns
continued even the eastern front was affected by the drain on skilled air crew
and air frames.
Damage caused to targets of "strategic" bombing was of only tertiary
importance unless you were one of those poor souls living in, or near the
target areas.
Not the Allied plan certainly but arguably the net effect.
Regards, Bob
> Matt Tope wrote:
> Kevin Walker wrote:
And for the USN, a vast increase in the number of light AA armament on
individual ships as well as ships dedicated to the air defense of other
vessels.
> During the whole of WW2 bombers were pretty crap at hitting specefic
Something like 100 bombs for 1 hit
> hence area bombing was employed, which whilst great at killing people
ASAAF day bombing was still aimed at a specific target, such as a particular
factory or rail yard, but much of the RAF nighttime raiding
was dedicated to "De-housing". I.e. "if you destroy their homes, then
they aren't effective factory workers".
> Neither the Royal Navy or the US Navy were unable to concentrate thier
What do you mean, there were only 1,600 ships at the landings at Saipan.
:)
> Giving that the Kreigsmarine of WW2 was pretty much dedicated to
e.g. KMS Bismark and KMS Graf Spee
> Submarines, especially U-Boats, and USN subs in the Pacific were the
Case in point: the Graf Spee and her sister ships (panzerschiffen) were
heavily armed with a main battery of 6x 11-inch guns, making them
capable of dealing with any merchant vessel or escort. But they were only
lightly armored and could not deal with a capital ship.
J
> Bob wrote:
> At the risk of committing air power heresy I'll go one further and
Actually, to my understanding, part of it was planned, with the daylight
bombing before June 1944 specifically intended to draw out the Luftwaffe
so that they could be engaged by the fighter escorts.
J