Brian Squared #3 said: Not lunch, but I looked it up. Interesting. According
to the (British run) websites I've seen, it wasn't the Royal Marines at Goose
Green, it was the
Paras.....
Tomb: Oops. Yes. Royal Marines, Paras.... Gung Ho lads in either case!:) Point
was they discovered some of the tactics taught at battle school didn't apply
so well there.
Or so I was taught when I trained in CF Infantry in 1987-88. They talked
> At 02:25 14/03/02 -0500, you wrote:
After a quick check:)
After the British naval losses at sea there was political pressure for action.
With the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and most of the Chinook helicopters
(heavy lift capacity) a shelved plan to raid Goose Green was
resurrected.
2 Para was given the objectives of Goose Green and Darwin, located on a narrow
isthmus (or neck of land) connecting East Falkland to Lafonia
(running north/south). Goose Green is the second largest settlement on
the Islands, Stanley being the largest. It had a grass airstrip which had a
squadron of Pucara aircraft stationed there, the settlement was also
garrisoned by 12th Infantry Regiment and C company of the 25th Infantry.
There was also FAA troops defending the Pucaras, anti-aircraft guns and
a half battery of 105mm howitzers. But the 12th Infantry Regiment was less
one company (B company detached as a airmobile reserve) and was missing a
large amount of it's heavy/support weapons, vehicles, reserve ammo and
entrenching tools due to the grounding of the supply ship Cuidad de Cordoba.
The 12th regiment's CO Lt. Col. Italo Piaggi's order's required him to defend
a perimeter measuring 31km.
The plan was to raid, inflict as much damage as possible then withdraw, but
once re-activated the orders were changed to "capture and stay"
For support the Paras had a half battery of 105mm guns airlifted to a position
near Camilla Creek House (just north of the isthmus), HMS Arrow
would also provide gunfire support but would have to be back at San Carlos
Sound by sun-up. Harriers (GR.3) off Hermes would provide close air
support (weather permitting).
The planning was poor and the operation was referred to as a
"come-as-you-are-party". The British Government made no friends by
releasing information by the impending attack, the Paras waiting at their
start line near Carmilla Creek House got hear what they were about to do
via the BBC.
The attack started about 0430 local time, with some Argentines surrendering
and others fighting, at first light the Argentines fell back to prepared
positions in a line along Boca House and Darwin Hill, these positions had good
fields of fire across the open ground and the centre was protected by
minefields (which included booby trapped, 125kg aircraft bombs).
Darwin Hill was occupied by a platoon from the reserve C Company, 25th
Regiment under Primer Teniente (Lieutenant?) Roberto Estevez. This platoon was
fully equipped with radios and weapons.
It was at this point that 2 Para's attack bogged down and Lt. Col. "H" Jones 2
Parra's CO was killed leading a charge to break the impasse (some have claimed
Col. Jones was "gong hunting. But he was in any event awarded the Victora
Cross posthumously). At this point the entire attack stalled as the Argentine
troops on their left managed to halt the British attack,
Major Chris Keeble the battalion 2IC assumed command and re-organized
the unit.
By noon 2 Para's A Coy had flanked the Argentine positions on Darwin Hill and
fired on them with LAW and Carl Gustav from close range. Estevez was
mortally wounded and his radio operator, Private Fabrico Carrascul, directed
the platoons fighting until he himself was killed (Both were posthumously
decorated). Only 3 men survived from Estevez's platoon to make it back to
Goose Green.
To the West, D Company 2 Para had found a seaside path that allowed them to
flank and fire a LAW onto the Argentine position, the shot killed and wounded
many including the local commander and in the confusion the Argentines fell
back.
By 1300 Argentine reinforcements, 84 men arrived via a 11 helicopter lift and
the Argentine perimeter moved in closer to Goose Green.
Lt. Col. Piaggi committed the new reinforcements and a platoon of the 25th
Infantry Regiment against the advancing British D and C companies and as
the fighting neared the airfield the air defense units fired on the Paras with
their 35mm guns. Some of these guns were in turn knocked out by British
Harriers, throughout the day bad weather and fog had limited air
support for both sides. Pucaras provided close air support using Napalm and
cannon fire, some being shot down with machine gun fire and blowpipe missiles.
One Harrier was shot down by 35mm cannon and one Scout helicopter delivering
ammunition forward was lost to a Pucara.
Gradually the Argentines were pushed back to the settlement of Goose Green and
A and D companies completed a loose encirclement of Green by dusk, C
company met heavy resistance around Darwin Hill and met up with D company
during a heavy firefight around the schoolhouse area. By the night the
Argentine forces were restricted to the settlement and the peninsula it sat
on.
During the night the due to concerns for the safety of the civilians gathered
in the social hall negotiations were conducted and the Argentine commanders
marched their troops on the airfield and surrendered.
The cost; The Argentines with 630 infantry (excluding reinforcements) and a
further 900 (500 FAA personnel, headquarters, artillery, logistics and some
naval personnel) lost 55 men (3 officers, nine NCOs and 43 men) with 86
wounded. The British with 450, lost 17 men (5 officers, 7 NCOs and 5 men) with
33 wounded.
As stated Lt.Col "H" Jones was posthumously awarded a Victora Cross while
Teniente Jaun Gomez Centurion (who commanded a platoon in the 25th Infantry
Regiment) was awarded the Cruz-La Nacion Argentina al Heroico Valor en
Combate for rescuing one of his severely wounded Corporals.
Cheers
Quoting Tomb <tomb@dreammechanics.com>:
> Brian Squared #3 said:
Was that the one where Col. H Jones ordered a bayonet charge of a trench (ISTR
because the mortar people couldn't keep up)? I mean, OK it worked we won, he
> From: Derek Fulton <derekfulton@bigpond.com>
> After a quick check :)
*SNIP*
> As stated Lt.Col "H" Jones was posthumously awarded a Victora Cross
Thanks, Derek, a very nice, concise reporting. Ever considered journalism?
3B^2
> --- Derek Fulton <derekfulton@bigpond.com> wrote:
> There was also FAA troops defending the Pucaras,
Argentine Air Force, I presume (Forza Aero Argentine, or whatever the correct
spelling in Spanish is).
> Darwin Hill was occupied by a platoon from the
Yup, First Lieutenant.
> break the impasse (some
If "gong hunting" means what I think it does, then it's a permenant state of
all officers. Lt. Col. Jones may have been an exception, but I'm a bit
skeptical.
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2002 at 08:58:43AM -0800, John Atkinson wrote:
> If "gong hunting" means what I think it does,
Aiming to get a medal. Usually not a posthumous one, if the thinking has
progressed that far.
> --- Roger Burton West <roger@firedrake.org> wrote:
That's what I figured. It's a perpetual state among officers.
> At 8:58 AM -0800 3/15/02, John Atkinson wrote:
I've heard several conversations about this, most seem to think that since he
was leading from the front, he wasn't 'gong hunting' or in the least, he was
doing so with good justification.
From: ~ On Behalf Of Ryan M Gill
Sent: 15 March 2002 17:38
Subject: Re: [OT] Goose Green
> At 8:58 AM -0800 3/15/02, John Atkinson wrote:
> If "gong hunting" means what I think it does, then
> I've heard several conversations about this, most seem
At that point in the battle both the adjutant and the second in command of "A"
Company had been killed, and from a recent television source I think I
recollect that two other junior officers had also become casualties. There was
a big hole in "H" Jones' chain of command, and the next most senior soldier in
the charge was a sergeant.
The mortars stayed up with the battle, but ran out of smoke far too early.
Once battle began, the artillery could not be safely used. The troops resorted
to white phosphorous grenades to provide cover.
Yes, there have been criticisms that a battalion commander has no business
leading an attack like that.
Pre-battle intelligence indicated that there were no
more than three to four companies defending Goose Green, and Lt. Col Jones
thought that the Argentinians would
fold up if attacked. His battalion second-in-command
stated that he believed the Colonel had calculated that it would be better to
risk ten to do what might take a hundred later.
As was the case later in the war, the enemy junior officers and NCOs stayed in
their machine gun nests and had to be evicted with heavy weapons.
culled from "Eyewitness Falklands", Robert Fox (war correspondant in the
battle at Goose Green)
JohnA said
> That's what I figured. It's a perpetual state among
Magic said:
> >From personal experience, not all officers.
Come on, Magic, you weren't expecting *John* to add qualifiers and limitations
when he could make a sweeping generalization, were you?
> From personal experience, not all officers.
My point was understood then.
<G>
Magic
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