[OT] Falklands re [GZG] Small thought re: Orbital Assault

In regards to the orbital assault/Falklands discussion here follows
some of the reasoning behind the desicion to land at San Carlos;

Excerpts taken from "Amphibious Assault Falklands", by Captain Michael Clapp
RN, retired, Commander Falklands Amphibious Task Group. Leo Cooper London,
1996.

First a quick over view of the key points desirable in the landing site;

"From the amphibious point of view the beaches within the AOA had to accept a
brigade landing quickly into at least four different areas so
that the commandos and battalions could swiftly achieve all-round and
mutual defence for themselves and the anchorage as a whole..." Page 78.

"From the millitary view point the beaches should have good infantry and tank
exits; they ought to be out of direct enemy gunfire range and not obviously
prone to immediate counter attack. Any dominating ground had to be easily and
quickly seizable. The surrounding area needed to
be suitable for Rapier anti-aircraft missile sites and the routes from
the beaches to Stanley (if we were to move out) had to be suitable for men on
foot and light vehicles. The distance to Stanley should, if at all possible,
be short and not dominated nor easily blocked or
ambushed by the enemy." Page 78-79.

After discussing the requirement for the landing sites the author relates how
the planning group kept comming back to San Carlos waters and details some of
the reasons for and against the site in the following;

"San Carlos was within reasonable range, by helicopter, from Stanley, with no
enemy bases en route apart from Darwin. It was, however, within direct range
of Darwin and Goose Green, should we need to eliminate these enemy bases which
we considered to be 'off the line of march' and which could, anyway, be
contained by some other method rather than attack; San Carlos inlet was
believed to be unoccupied; its topography would most suit Rapier; it was
bordered by three suitable and seperate beaches each beneath a possible unit
objective; it could be readily protected against surface threats; it contained
beaches suitable for the Beach Support Area and it possessed suitable flat
patches for mainteneance and Sea Harrirer Strips. There were, of course,
strong arguments against San Carlos which would take our ingenuity and
forethought to counter it it was not to be confirmed by 'London'. For a start
it was within range of
un-refuled Argentine aircraft; the approaches and entrance could be
mined before and after a landing; it was possible that a submarine could lie
in wait in advance of a landing or creep in undetected after
one- a very major worry; there were few if any convenient areas where
helicopters or Harriers could actually hide; it was a long way to yomp to
Stanley if Helicopters were not to be employed. Even then we knew that the
shortage of helicopters would prevent their use for much more
than 'ammunition forward and casualties back'." Page 79-80.

The planning described above occurred before the loss to exocet of
Atlantic Conveyor (on D+4), and thus whether or not said helicopters
had been available would not have overly effected the operational plan.

"Any opponent worth his salt would have put himself in our shoes and
identified a similar place as ours as likelt 'first foot' and would therefore
prepare his defences accordingly, but another factor in our deliberations, and
this is not hindsight, was the impression we had that the Argentines expected
us to do things the American way and land, if not straight into Stanley, then
very close indeed. Luckily they they appeared to be conducting their defence
accordingly, as we were about to discover by courtesy of the SBS and SAS."
Page 80.

Just to shed some light on the reasons why (rightly or wrongly) the Brits did
what they did, and also some interesting points (as alrady discussed in other
posts) on the requirements of an assault sight which should be applicable to
the gaming table.

Cheers,