> Second question, is 3:1 really a reasonable attacker ratio for a fun
Oher games I've played suggested a 2:1 attacker:defender ratio. I guess you're
going to have to try it. 3:1 sounds a bit high. Also depends on the terrain
between the attack and defender. Are we talking about a mad rush through open
terrain? Or are we talking about running from hedge to hedge?
I'd think it would be fun to try both 2:1 and 3:1 just to see how it plays.
Now, we've all heard the old saw about requiring 3:1 to attack a fixed
defense.
This is (somewhat) a real life truism (or a reasonable rule of thumb).
Depending on the defense, of course, this changes.
But what are fair numbers in DS2 for an interesting game?
What are fair benefits to accord the defenders?
How significant should mines and other obstacles be considered to be?
I'm guessing that some benefits a defender might receive:
Registered batteries (faster/less deviation)
Minefields (and fake ones) as a channeling tool Obstacles as another
channeling tool (concertina, tank obstacles, etc) Trenches with overhead
protect Bunkers Selection of useful terrain to channelize or deny passage to
enemy forces Registered ranges (staked, or by features) to allow better
infantry fire Tank revetments to allow tanks to be hull or turret down (and
other AFVs) Berms or dirt walls Intelligence on attacking forces (qty and mix)
TacAir
Attackers: Intelligence on minefields and other channelizing obstacles
Intelligence on defending forces (qty and mix)
Location of enemy bunkers/etc
Artillery (guns, rockets and mortars)
Engineers/Assault Pioneers with appropriate obstacle reduction equipment
Scouts TacAir Armour and other mobile forces to allow exploitations of
breaches
First question is are any of these things not represented in the DS2 rules
well?
Second question, is 3:1 really a reasonable attacker ratio for a fun game in
DS2 against a prepared defense?
Now, I know a scenario has to be balanced to some extent by eye in these cases
because the efficacy of a defense has a lot to do with what types of units are
attacking, how many, what type of artillery, etc are present. And the presence
of any defender reserves. But some ballpark idea of fun force balance must
exist in the community... clearly a number of you have played large games....
So, thoughts?
> Tomb wrote:
> Registered batteries (faster/less deviation)
I won't comment on the rest, but I'll give this suggestion for representing
preregistered artillery: Since most DS II arty already hits automatically,
give the defender a certain number of pre-registered spots on the board
(for a price). Any mission called on one of these spot arrives in the spotting
unit's activation, not in the next activation.
3B^2
> At 3:33 PM -0700 4/9/02, Brian Bilderback wrote:
That seems correct. I'd say that a specific group of units should be able to
make this call. But really any LT or PSG in on that side should be able to
make that call. Artillery flexibility and response is going up not down as
time goes on.
> Second question, is 3:1 really a reasonable attacker ratio for a fun
> From what I've read, the 3:1 ratio is the suggested ideal if the
Quoting Ground Zero Games <jon@gzg.keme.co.uk>:
> >From what I've read, the 3:1 ratio is the suggested ideal if the
There is a formula for figuring out if you'll win a battle or not -
devised by
a retired colonel - Dupey?
Ah - found a reference:
Dupuy, T.N. Colonel, US Army, Ret. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History
to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles. Fairfax: HERO
Books, 1985.
Did a load of analysis and then went and checked the results to see if they
came out right for historical battles. Includes technology levels and
destructive capabilities and terrain modifiers and all sorts of things.
ISTR he had to bodge in a fix for Israelis, because they've successfully
defended against 6:1 odds.
The book about it has some interesting observations: I recall one about German
soldiers being about twice as effective as Allied soldiers throughout most of
WWII, attributed to the fact they were outnumbered for most of the last year,
so it was much easier for them to find targets...
Interesting read. And at the time it counted as work :-)
I have seen figures as high as 7:1 quoted to guarantee a breakthrough.
The Lanchester equations square numbers to estimate combat power so 2:1 is
really 4:1, but it is always difficult to include intangible into the initial
'count'.
J.
> At 13:03 10/04/2002 +0100, you wrote:
I guess
> >you're going to have to try it. 3:1 sounds a bit high. Also depends
Dr PJD Lambshead Head, Nematode Research Group Department of Zoology The
Natural History Museum London SW7 5BD, UK.
Tel +44 (0)20 7942 5032
Fax +44 (0)20 7942 5433
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002 13:03:04 +0100, Ground Zero Games
<jon@gzg.keme.co.uk> wrote:
> From what I've read, the 3:1 ratio is the suggested ideal if the
The historically given ratio is 3:1. This is outlined rather well in
_Understanding War: A History and Theory of Combat_ by Col. Trevor N.
Dupuy,
US Army (ret.). Funny enough, I've been reading _Understanding War_
recently.
Dupuy puts it in a simple chart format on page 34 of his book (best viewed in
a fixed pitch font):
Personnel Attacker Defender
Strength Success Outcome Success
Ratio Certain Uncertain Certain
--------- -------- --------- --------
Attacker to 300% 200% 150% Defender or more or less Strength Ratio
Defender to 33% 50% 67% Attacker or less or more Strength Ratio
However, combat strength, or rather combat power, is given by the following
formula: P = N x V x Q, where P is combat power, N is number of troops, V are
the variable circumstances that affect troops in combat, and Q is the quality
of the troops.
Historically 3:1 works well, but realize that it's troops engaged, not just
troops hanging around the battle area.
Further in the book he talks about things like force multipliers and other
things. The 3:1 odds were a lot easier to use in the musket era on down into
the ancient era. Today, with smart bombs, nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons, and high tech surveillance systems, it's quite difficult to calculate
the actual strength of a particular force. Dupuy complicates the P = NVQ
formula by converting N into force strength, and Q into a combat effectiveness
value.
It's a good read for anyone interested in a theory of combat.
On Tue, 9 Apr 2002 17:07:07 -0400, "Tomb" <tomb@dreammechanics.com>
wrote:
> Now, we've all heard the old saw about requiring 3:1 to attack a fixed
As I allude to in my previous message, it's not quite that simple. 3:1 isn't a
ratio for fixed defense, it's for certain of success for the attacker.
1.5:1
is a certainty of success for the defender. Everything else is in the middle.
Also, the ratio is that of combat power, not just numbers. A hasty defense
gets less of a bonus to the defender than a prepared defense, for instance.
As my previous message suggests, the 3:1 ratio is for a defender having
certain success and 1.5:1 giving them certain failure. Between those two
ratios is the ratio of "uncertainty". _That_ is where you want to be for
a game.
> --- Allan Goodall <agoodall@att.net> wrote:
> The historically given ratio is 3:1. This is
Side note: I've always been curious how a former line officer could get so
disconnected from reality.
Remember, he was leading the charge on the 1990 "US will suffer massive
casualties from the Iraqi Army" front.
At least one of his books has the Israelis getting decisively defeated by the
Syrians and Egyptians. Feh.
He has a serious ossifer-style tendency to want to
reduce everything to a simple numerical formula. If life were that simple we'd
never need to actually fight.
> Personnel Attacker Defender
Really? You want a list of circumstances where that has not proven true?
Oh, of course, he makes every example fit the above case by selectively
picking his "quality" and "Variable" multipliers so that they work out neatly.
But then again, he only considers Israelis twice as effective as Arabs.
Considering that in deliberate defense 2 Israeli brigades stopped and chewed
up 5 Syrian divisions in '73, I don't think his numbers work out.
And he didn't (prior to 1990) consider US troops any more effective than Iraqi
ones. Operating under the
well-known retiree principle that the military can't
function without their very indispensable self.