D-Day was Shermans

[quoted original message omitted]

> While the Allies certainly had access to more supplies than the

> Also, the Allies had Air superiority all the way from the Beaches to

Good point.

> A further advantage that the Allies had, was their command structure

I was more referring to the Higher command echelons, but mistrust between the
political and military branches of the German leadership had had such an
impact on the lower echelons that in some instances it caused command
paralysis. The actual unit leaders had some initiative, but here's an example
of what I'm talking about: The (IIRC) 21st Panzer was stationed
around Caen on D-day.  At 0800 the commander had his tanks warmed up and
ready to counterattack, but he had to wait until the higher HQ gave him the ok
to do what he knew was the right thing to do. This is a perfect example of how
a mess at higher echelons neutralized the initiative of a lower level
commander. Had the lower levels not been subject to a mess of an upper command
structure the Germans would have given the Allies a much harder fight, and
quite possibly defeated the invasions.

> Looking at the D-day invasions today I don't see how anything

> Errr..."anything analogous won't happen again..".? Isn't what you

My point is that there wouldn't be a mass invasion against a "hot" beach. A
debacle like Omaha wouldn't be excuted again simply because we have the
capability and precision to neutralize the kind of defenses that were present
on the beaches then. Also there's the sheer scale of the operation. I'm not
sure a situation would arise where an operation on that scale would be
necessary. Of course there's also the argument that most modern militaries
wouldn't attempt a static defense simply because a mobile defense in depth has
proven much more effective.

Bill

> KH.Ranitzsch@t-online.de wrote:

ISTR a German joke from WWII that went:

"When you see lots of airplanes, that's the Americans. When you see a few
airplanes, that's the British. When you see no airplanes, that's the
Luftwaffe."

> bbrush@unlnotes.unl.edu wrote:

> ready to counterattack, but he had to wait until the higher HQ gave

That's a possibility, but a slight one at that point, given the superiority of
the Allies in the air. More likely what would've happened is that the Allied
forces would have suffered more casualties, but would have been able to hang
on.

> My point is that there wouldn't be a mass invasion against a "hot"
beach.
> A debacle like Omaha wouldn't be excuted again simply because we have

I'm not certain that I'd characterize Omaha Beach as a debacle. Certainly, the
units landing there suffered much higher casualties than those on the other
beaches (8 men left at the end of the day out of the lead company of the 116th
Rgmt. which made the initial landings!) but even so, the primary reason for
the difficulty on Omaha was the *failure* of Allied intelligence to detect the
presence of the 352nd Division, along with the failure of the Air Forces to
effectively use strategic bombing forces in a tactical role. I won't, however,
dispute your point that we probably will never see the likes of it again; but
that's probably due more to the fact that pound for pound, the individual
soldier in the modern era can draw on more firepower than soldiers in any
previous time.

> At 12:15 PM -0800 1/10/02, Mark Reindl wrote:

Market Garden was a debacle. D-Day was a success.

> --- bbrush@unlnotes.unl.edu wrote:

> My point is that there wouldn't be a mass invasion

True. BUT:

> A debacle like Omaha wouldn't be excuted again

It's not a debacle if you win. Granted the 1st and
the 29th got chewed up--but they won.  Side note:  Of
the four units I've been in, 2 were first wave at Omaha, while the other had
been in the second wave in
it's previous incarnation as 1/170 IN.  It's been a
bit of a study of mine. Highest casualties were sustained by the 116th INF
(VaARNG). Of the units I was in, highest casualties was 30% by the 299 EN BN
which was acting as shore parties (not enough UDTs to go around, so they were
standing in).

> My point is that there wouldn't be a mass invasion against a "hot"
beach. A debacle like Omaha wouldn't be excuted again simply because

insert "we believe that"

> we have the capability and precision to neutralize the kind of defenses

Even if we do have the capacity to do that against a comparable level
opponent, we're not the only military force on the planetr, and some of them
might be willing to try an invasion even without wundertech.

> Also there's the sheer scale of the

People's Republic vs Republic of China in about 15 years.

> Of course there's also the argument that most

Under what circumstances? a) If you can catch'em coming in, they're a lot more
vulnerable. Granted you need a mobile *reserve* but that doesn't mean there's
no point in waterline defenses. b) this assumes you have "depth" that you
don't mind losing. That's not always the case.

Well a couple of people have said something similar, but I'm not sure I agree.
Omaha was a success, but you can have a debacle that turns out ok. I think
it's a testament to the men who fought there that it was a success. If you
look at the plan and then what actually happened it was a debacle. Everything
turned out ok, but almost nothing happened according to plan. In fact about
the only thing that DID happen according to plan is that the first wave hit
when they were supposed to.

Make no mistake, the admiration I feel for the men I fought at Omaha Beach is
so great I can't adequately express it. That being said they succeeded despite
the plan, not because of it.

Just a short list of things that didn't go right at Omaha:

With a couple notable exceptions almost no unit hit where they were supposed
to. The aerial bombardment was a complete failure. The naval bombardment was
ineffective. The rocket bombardment missed entirely. With the exception of the
743rd none of the tank units hit the beach in operating order. The infantry
had no communications with the forces offshore.

What saved the invasion was the heroism of the men on the beach, and the
destroyers coming in to point blank range to give immediate and accurate
supporting fire.

A successful debacle in my opinion.

Now Market Garden was just an unmitigated disaster.

Bill

John Atkinson

<johnmatkinson@yahoo.com> To:
gzg-l@CSUA.Berkeley.EDU
Sent by: cc:

                    owner-gzg-l@lists.CSUA.Be       Subject:     Re:
D-Day was Shermans
rkeley.EDU

                    01/10/02 03:15 PM

                    Please respond to gzg-l

> --- bbrush@unlnotes.unl.edu wrote:

> My point is that there wouldn't be a mass invasion

True. BUT:

> A debacle like Omaha wouldn't be excuted again

It's not a debacle if you win. Granted the 1st and
the 29th got chewed up--but they won.  Side note:  Of
the four units I've been in, 2 were first wave at Omaha, while the other had
been in the second wave in
it's previous incarnation as 1/170 IN.  It's been a
bit of a study of mine. Highest casualties were sustained by the 116th INF
(VaARNG). Of the units I was in, highest casualties was 30% by the 299 EN BN
which was acting as shore parties (not enough UDTs to go around, so they were
standing in).

> Well a couple of people have said something similar, but I'm not

That turns out not to be the case. Courtesy of dictionary.com:
"de·ba·cle (d-bäkl, -bkl, db-kl)  n.
A sudden, disastrous collapse, downfall, or defeat; a rout. A total, often
ludicrous failure. The breaking up of ice in a river. A violent flood."

Now, I suppose you could say that the defenders felt the Allied assault was "a
violent flood"...

> --- bbrush@unlnotes.unl.edu wrote:

Uhhh... not according to the definition of debacle. Debacles don't turn out
OK.

[quoted original message omitted]

From: "Rick Rutherford" <Rick@esr.com>

> KH.Ranitzsch@t-online.de wrote:

> --- "K.H.Ranitzsch" <KH.Ranitzsch@t-online.de> wrote:

> Just think of, for example, anti-tank guided

The Swedes have truck-mounted Hellfire missles in
their coastal defense units. I think that would ruin
anyone's day--and since they are mobile they are
harder to neutralize.

> BTW. I have read press reports that in the Kosovo

This is true. Also true is the fact that until the KLA started a ground
offensive to start trying to take down the Yugoslav Army units, they were
dispersed enough to practically ignore the air strikes indefinitely.